This paper analyzes the scope for systematic rules-based fiscal activism in open economies. Relative to a balanced budget rule, automatic stabilizers significantly improve welfare. But they minimize fiscal instrument volatility rather than business cycle volatility. A more aggressively countercyclical tax revenue gap rule increases welfare gains by around 50 percent, with only modest increases in fiscal instrument volatility. For raw materials revenue gaps the government should let automatic stabilizers work. The best fiscal instruments are targeted transfers, consumption taxes and labor taxes, or, if it enters into private utility, government spending. The welfare gains are significantly lower for more open economies.
Introduction
This paper analyzes the scope for systematic rules-based fiscal activism in open economies. In doing so it follows in the tradition of the monetary policy literature, which starting with Taylor (1993) has developed a conceptual framework that has proved invaluable for policymakers. It is partly due to this success that fiscal activism has long been deemed unnecessary. But that is now changing rapidly, with massive countercyclical fiscal measures having been announced by, among others, the US, the EU, the UK, and China. As we discuss in more detail in the literature review in the following section, these recent developments represent only the latest twist in a long history that has seen fiscal activism come into, fall out of, and now come back into favor in the post-war period.
The current state of the theoretical literature is of most interest to this paper. It can be summarized as follows. First, models with non-Ricardian features in which fiscal policy can have a significant business cycle stabilizing role have only recently become more common.
We will use one such model. Second, there is almost no analysis of systematic rules-based fiscal policy that could eventually become the equivalent in practical usefulness to interest rate rules in monetary policy. This is where this paper attempts to make a contribution.
The paper proposes a class of rules that, similar to Taylor rules, should be implementable by policymakers. In general terms this means that a policy instrument, or an aggregate policy variable that depends on a policy instrument, ensures debt sustainability in the long run, but also stabilizes the business cycle in the short run by reacting to a real activity gap measure. In our proposal, the aggregate policy variable is the budget surplus to GDP ratio, the available policy instruments are six tax rates and spending categories, and the gaps are the tax revenue gap, the raw materials revenue gap, and the debt gap. We will explain why output or absorption gaps are not desirable alternatives. We attempt to make the analysis applicable to a broad group of countries by choosing an open economy setup. For concreteness we calibrate our model economy to Chile. We perform a full second-order approximation of the model and utility function, and we numerically optimize the coefficients of the policy reaction function according to a welfare criterion. Results are presented by way of grid searches over those coefficients.
Our paper focuses on the following questions. First, how should fiscal policy respond to the different gap variables to maximize welfare without causing excessive volatility in fiscal instruments? Second, which of the many feasible fiscal instruments should be chosen to obtain the maximum welfare gain? And third, what is the contribution of different types of shocks to the welfare and macroeconomic volatility results?
We find that tax revenue gap rules can be used to represent a continuum of rules that includes the balanced budget rule, the structural surplus rule, and highly countercyclical rules. We use the balanced budget rule as the reference point for our welfare analysis, and find that relative to this rule the structural surplus rule improves welfare very significantly.
A structural surplus rule targets a desired long-run government surplus to GDP ratio and responds to cyclically low (high) government surpluses by increasing (reducing) government debt rather than instantaneously changing fiscal instruments. This turns out to be a very natural representation of the concept of automatic stabilizers, which is discussed in more detail in Section 2. Automatic stabilizers, which are still favored by most commentators, are therefore a fiscal rule, but one that minimizes fiscal instrument volatility. A key insight of our paper is that, if minimizing business cycle volatility should instead be the main objective, we can gain very significantly by reparameterizing a structural surplus rule as a much more strongly countercyclical tax revenue gap rule. We find that this increases the welfare gains by around 50%, with only modest increases in fiscal instrument volatility.
Raw materials revenue is a critical and highly volatile component of fiscal revenue in many developing countries, including Chile. We find that a countercyclical response to a raw materials revenue gap is not desirable, instead here the government should rely on automatic stabilizers. In other words, net excess revenue from such gaps should be saved by the government and passed on to households over time through lower taxes or higher spending. This is because the government has a comparative advantage over liquidity constrained households in smoothing wealth shocks.
The recent literature, with few exceptions, considers only one gap variable in fiscal rules, namely the debt gap. 1 We find that such a version of our rule does produce non-negligible welfare gains over a balanced budget rule -it performs about as well as automatic stabilizers.
But it is far inferior to the best countercyclical rules. In such rules the coefficient on the debt gap plays a comparatively small role.
We are also able to report on the relative benefits of six different fiscal instruments, and find that the best choices are targeted transfers, consumption taxes and labor taxes. But government spending becomes the preferred instrument if it enters private utility with a unitary marginal rate of substitution with consumption. Finally, we find that the welfare gains are significantly lower for more open economies.
It is critical to embed the analysis of fiscal rules in an appropriate overall modeling
framework. An obvious candidate is the new generation of open economy monetary business cycle models with both nominal and real rigidities that is being deployed rapidly in central banks and policymaking institutions to replace the previous generation of models, which
were not completely based on microfoundations. 2 However, while such models are well suited to address many monetary business cycle issues, several important papers argue that they face difficulties in adequately replicating the dynamic short-run effects of fiscal policy. 3 They also have serious shortcomings when applied to the analysis of medium-and long-run fiscal issues such as the crowding-out effects of a permanent increase in public debt. 4 The key factor that accounts for these difficulties is the absence of non-Ricardian household savings behavior that would make the timing of fiscal interventions non-neutral. A model that adds non-Ricardian behavior while maintaining the nominal and real rigidities of existing models can also account for the critical interactions between monetary and fiscal policies.
The candidate non-Ricardian features known from the literature are overlapping generations models following Blanchard (1985) and Weil (1989) and infinite horizon models with a subset of liquidity constrained agents following Gali, López-Salido and Vallés (2007) . In this paper we use the latter model class, mainly because the consumption optimality condition of an overlapping generations model can only be derived under certainty equivalence, which rules out welfare analysis. However, this modeling choice also has significant costs, in that liquidity constrained agents imply a much more extreme short-run behavior of consumption in response to fiscal interventions, especially in an open economy.
The rest of the model features endogenous labor supply, endogenous capital accumulation, productive government investment in infrastructure, habit persistence, investment and import adjustment costs, sticky nominal goods prices, and an endowment sector for raw materials, which are used as a manufacturing input.
We assume that there is no coordination problem between monetary and fiscal policies, and that monetary policy follows the familiar type of interest rate reaction function, calibrated to reflect the historical conduct of monetary policy in Chile. 5 A key result is that if a large share of agents are liquidity constrained, as has long been the case in most developing countries, and as may soon be the case in many developed countries, the ability of monetary policy to stabilize the economy is much reduced because it relies on intertemporal substitution effects. Fiscal policy on the other hand becomes more powerful because it relies on income effects. The consequences can be illustrated by comparing the welfare gains of an optimized fiscal rule over a balanced budget rule with the welfare gains from inflation targeting over exchange rate targeting. The former are four to five times larger.
It was for monetary policy that the pendulum first started to swing back in favor of activism. This resurgence was based on both much improved theoretical foundations and on empirical arguments. As for theory, the time-dependent price adjustment formulations of Taylor (1980) , Rotemberg (1982) and Calvo (1983) made it possible to incorporate nominal rigidities into rational expectations models with forward-looking optimizing agents.
Empirical support came from evidence showing that monetary policy has significant shortrun real effects, such as Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1996, 1998) and Leeper, Sims and Zha (1996) . Finally, the work on monetary policy rules of Taylor (1993) , and on constrained discretion, e.g. Bernanke and Mishkin (1997) , made it possible to think about discretionary monetary policy as a theoretically coherent and empirically testable strategy.
But the presumption was still that policy activism should be left to monetary policy. It was argued (Gramlich (1999) ) that it is critical that fiscal policy deliver its stimulus in a "timely, targeted and temporary" (TTT) manner, but that experience showed this to be hard to achieve.
Legislatures are generally much slower at changing taxation and spending than central banks at changing the policy rate, they may not deliver stimulus where it is most needed but instead where it is politically advantageous, and they may be reluctant to withdraw it sufficiently quickly in good times to preserve fiscal sustainability.
Furthermore, empirical work has still not fully settled the theoretical debates about the effectiveness of fiscal activism, mainly because isolating the discretionary component of fiscal policy poses serious methodological problems. But at least the key studies show significantly positive fiscal multipliers of between 0.5 as in Mountford and Uhlig (2002) and around 1 as in Blanchard and Perotti (2002) . 8, 9 The evidence certainly does not strongly support the Ricardian Equivalence hypothesis. To settle these issues in a convincing manner, the most promising approach is the Bayesian estimation of structural DSGE models, which has been used very successfully in the monetary policy literature. But progress with models that have a meaningful role for fiscal policy has been slow until recently. Theoretical work on fiscal policy in the 1990s 10 and in the current decade has focused almost exclusively on the study of optimal taxation that minimizes tax wedges. Because the models used have few rigidities, and because typically state-contingent taxes are assumed to be available, this analysis finds little benefit from time variation in taxes and spending. This has started to change more recently with the introduction of New Keynesian models that not only contain significant nominal and real rigidities, but that also have a non-Ricardian element, liquidity constrained households. A key contribution in this literature is Gali, Lopez-Salido and Valles (2007).
But there has been almost no progress on fiscal rules. Taylor (2000) considers a rule in which the budget surplus depends on the output gap, but he argues that such a rule is unnecessary, and in fact undesirable, because the Fed has been very successful at stabilizing the business cycle and would only suffer from having to forecast the fiscal stance. He therefore argues, along with many other commentators at that time, that the role of fiscal policy should be limited to minimizing distortions and to "letting automatic stabilizers work". Automatic stabilizers describes channels through which policy can be mildly countercyclical even if fiscal instruments are not varied at all in response to the business cycle. Holding spending, the transfer system and tax rates constant in an upturn reduces the spending to GDP ratio and the transfers to GDP ratio, and it increases the tax revenues to GDP ratio. This latter effect becomes even stronger if the tax system is progressive.
Crucially however, Taylor Apart from the Maastricht criteria of the EU, which include a 60% of GDP maximum debt and a 3% of GDP maximum deficit, a small number of other countries pursues either a debt rule or a golden rule that limits the deficit to financing public investment over the cycle. More interestingly, four countries pursue structural surplus rules fairly similar to the one analyzed in this paper, including Brazil (4.5% primary surplus), Chile (0.5% overall surplus), Sweden (2% overall surplus) and Switzerland (0% overall surplus).
The Model
The world consists of 2 countries, Chile and the rest of the world (RW), whose shares in world output equal ω/ (ω + ω * ) and ω * / (ω + ω * ). Chile's most important export by far has been copper. We will therefore from now on refer to the raw materials sector as the copper sector. Copper output is modeled as an endowment, with flexible copper prices that are arbitraged worldwide. The two major sources of volatility in copper prices are endowment shocks and technology driven demand shocks.
Manufacturers buy investment goods from distributors, labor from households, and copper from the world copper market. They sell to domestic and foreign distributors, with exports priced in producer currency. Distributors produce final output by assembling domestic and foreign manufactured goods, and then combining them with a publicly provided, tax-financed capital stock (infrastructure). Final output is sold to domestic consumers, investors and the government, subject to nominal rigidities in price setting.
Asset markets are incomplete. There is complete home bias in ownership of domestic firms and in government debt, which takes the form of nominally non-contingent one-period bonds denominated in domestic currency. There are two international financial claims, first claims on the dividend income of foreign copper firms, and second nominally non-contingent one-period bonds denominated in the currency of RW.
Technology in the world economy grows at the constant rate g = T t /T t−1 , where T t is the level of labor augmenting world technology. The model's real variables, say x t , therefore have to be rescaled by T t , where we will use the notationx t = x t /T t . The steady state ofx t is denoted byx.
Households Infinitely Lived Households
The utility of a representative INF household at time t depends on consumption c , and real money balances (M t /P t ) (where P t is the consumer price index).
Lifetime expected utility has the form
where β is the discount factor, v determines the degree of habit persistence, γ is the labor supply elasticity, and is the interest elasticity of money demand. For the money demand coefficient ϑ we will only consider the case of the cashless limit advocated by Woodford (2003) , where ϑ −→ 0. S c t is a consumption shock. We will also consider an alternative where government consumption g , which is taxed at the rate τ c,t , is given by a CES aggregate over consumption goods varieties c
with elasticity of substitution σ:
A household can hold nominal domestic government bonds B t denominated in domestic currency, and nominal foreign bonds F t denominated in the currency of RW. 11 In each case the time subscript t denotes financial claims held from period t to period t+1. Gross nominal 11 We adopt the convention throughout the paper that all nominal/real variables are written interest rates on Chilean and RW currency denominated assets held from t to t + 1 are i t and i * t . We denote the nominal exchange rate vis-a-vis RW by E t , and gross nominal exchange rate depreciation by ε t = E t /E t−1 . The real exchange rate vis-a-vis RW is e t = (E t P * t )/P t . To calibrate an empirically reasonable process for Chilean sovereign interest rate spreads, we assume that the country faces an external interest rate risk premium ξ f t that depends on expectations of the current account (ca t ) to GDP (gdp t ) ratio and on exogenous shocks S f x t :
We assume that the premium ξ f t is paid to an intermediary who distributes it in a lump-sum fashion to residents of RW.
In addition to interest income households receive after tax labor income, lump-sum dividend distributions and net transfers from the government. Real labor income equals
, where w t = W t /P t is the real wage rate and τ L,t is the labor tax rate. Dividends are received from the manufacturing and distribution sectors d Tt . This is a technical assumption that allows us to allocate at least a part of the economy's dividend income to LIQ agents even though they do not own firms. Both groups of households also pay lump-sum taxes τ ls,t to the government in proportion to their consumption shares. The IN F household's budget constraint in nominal terms is
in upper/lower case letters. For real asset stocks, each nominal asset is deflated by the consumer price index of the currency of its denomination, so that real domestic bonds are b t = B t /P t and real internationally traded bonds are f t = F t /P * t .
We denote the multiplier of this budget constraint by Λ t , and let λ t = Λ t P t . The INF household maximizes (1) subject to (2) and (4). The first-order conditions are shown in Appendix A.
Liquidity Constrained Households
The objective function of LIQ households is assumed to be identical to that of INF households except that they do not hold money and are not subject to autonomous consumption demand shocks S c t . But their budget constraint is different in that they can consume at most their current income, which consists of their after tax wage income plus three types of net government transfers, first lump-sum transfers from INF to LIQ agents τ LIQ T,t , second their share of lump-sum taxes, and third lump-sum transfers Υ t that are targeted specifically to LIQ agents:
The condition for the optimal consumption-leisure choice of LIQ households is identical to that of INF households. Aggregate consumption and labor supply are given byč t =
Manufacturing
Manufacturers are perfectly competitive in their input and output markets. They pay out each period's net cash flow as dividends to IN F households and maximize the present discounted value of these dividends. The technology of a representative manufacturer is given by a CES production function in capital k t−1 , labor t , and copper x t :
The technology scale factor T is used to calibrate relative levels of per capita GDP in Chile and RW. The elasticities of substitution between copper and capital/labor and between labor and capital are ξ X and ξ Z , respectively. Labor augmenting technology consists of the level of world technology T t and of a stationary country specific productivity shock S a t . The relative copper demand coefficient α X t is subject to shocks. Capital is accumulated within firms, and is subject to quadratic adjustment costs G I,t in gross investment I t
where firm specific indices i indicate choice variables of the firm. The law of motion of capital is described by
where δ k represents the depreciation rate of privately held physical capital and S inv t is a shock to investment.
Real dividends d
k t is the return to capital, and q t is the shadow price of installed capital (Tobin's q). The optimization problem of each manufacturing firm is given by
subject to (6)- (8), where the multiplier of (8) is q t . The optimality conditions are shown in Appendix A.
Copper Production
In each period Chile and RW receive a stochastic endowment flow of copper x sup t . This endowment is sold to manufacturers in Chile and RW, with total demand for each country given by x dem t . Copper exports are therefore given by
The world market for copper is perfectly competitive, with flexible prices that are arbitraged
A constant share of steady state copper revenue is paid out to domestic factors of production as dividendsd X . The rest is divided in fixed shares (1 − s x f ) and s x f between payments to the government g X t , for the case of publicly owned producers, and dividends to foreign owners f X t . This means that all benefits of favorable copper price shocks accrue exclusively to the government and foreigners, and vice versa for unfavorable shocks. This corresponds more closely to the situation of the Chilean copper sector than the polar opposite assumption of assuming equal shares between the three recipients at all times.
We have f
The dividends received by Chilean households from ownership of RW copper producers are then given by d
Distribution
Firms in this sector are indexed by i. They produce final output z D t (i) by combining domestic manufacturing output y H t (i) with foreign manufacturing output y F t (i) subject to an adjustment cost G T F,t (i) that makes rapid changes in the share of foreign tradables costly 14 , and then combining the resulting private output composite y 
The technology for private output is given by
where ξ T is the elasticity of substitution between Chilean and RW goods and α H is a share parameter determining long-run home bias. The technology for combining private output with the public capital stock is given by
The stock of public infrastructure k G t−1 is identical for all firms and provided free of charge to the end user (but not of course to the taxpayer). It enters in a similar fashion to the level of technology, but with decreasing returns to public capital as long as α G < 0. The advantage of this formulation is that it retains constant returns to scale at the level of each firm. The term S is a technology scale factor that is set to ensure k G /g α G S = 1. The conditions for cost-minimizing input choice are shown in Appendix A.
Each group of distributors' customers demands the same CES aggregate of distributed varieties as consumers, see equation (2) . The aggregate demand for variety i is therefore
where D t (i) and D t remain to be specified by way of market clearing conditions. Following
Ireland (2001) and Laxton and Pesenti (2003) , inflation adjustment costs are quadratic in changes in the rate of inflation rather than in price levels:
The first order condition for pricing is symmetric across firms, and given by
where p D t is the marginal cost of final output. Furthermore, we assume that observed inflation is subject to autocorrelated measurement errors S π t that account for inflation variability not explained by the other shocks in the model. Observed final goods inflation π obs t is therefore
Government
Monetary policy follows a conventional policy rule for the nominal interest rate that depends on an inflation gap. Fiscal policy takes the parameterization of this rule as given and optimizes the coefficients of a fiscal policy rule that depends on a tax revenue gap, a copper revenue gap, and in some versions of the rule on a debt gap.
Monetary Policy
The interest rate rule is
The long-run or target real interest rate isr and the inflation target isπ. Both Chile and RW are assumed to follow rules of this type.
Fiscal Policy
The government's policy rule for transfers from IN F agents to LIQ agents specifies that the redistributed share of dividends is ι ≤ ψ:
Government consumption spending g cons t is wasteful except when we allow for it to enter the utility function. Government investment spending g inv t on the other hand augments the stock of publicly provided infrastructure capital k G t , the evolution of which is given by
The government budget constraint, in nominal terms, therefore takes the form
where s t is the primary surplus and τ t is total tax revenue. The final component of fiscal policy is the policy rule, which is presented separately in the following section.
Fiscal Policy Rules Chile's Structural Surplus Rule
Fiscal policy in Chile currently follows the structural surplus rule (henceforth SSR) explained in Medina and Soto (2006) . A suitable model representation iš
where the exposition now uses variables in their growth-normalized form because this is more instructive. In this rule the government surplus is defined aš
which equals the sum of the primary surplus and net interest payments on government debt.
The target gs rat is exogenous, and in the Chilean case has been fixed at +0.5 since May
2007
. 15 The remaining items represent cyclical adjustment terms whereby the government saves, in the form of reduced debt or increased assets, excess tax revenue and excess revenue from copper sales. Potential tax revenueτ pot t is given by the same formula as actual tax revenue τ t in equation (27) , at current tax rates, but with the actual tax bases replaced by potential tax bases that are estimated by a team of macroeconomic experts. For the purpose of this paper we assume that potential tax bases equal their steady state values:
The treatment forǧ pot Xt by the Chilean authorities is slightly different. Here a team of experts estimates the potential or long-run international price of copper and the potential domestic output of copper for an estimate of potential dollar revenue, but changes in the real exchange rate are allowed to affect the estimate of potential revenue in terms of Chilean currency:
It is worth discussing some important implications of this rule. We start with dynamic stability, specifically the ability of the rule to stabilize long-run debt. Equation (29) shows that a SSR anchors the long-run debt to GDP ratio at
Our calibrated economy features a 5% annual nominal growth rateπg and a surplus target of 0.5% of GDP, which implies a long-run government assets to GDP ratio of approximately 10%. 16 More importantly however, it implies a quarterly autoregressive coefficient on debt 15 The target had previously been held at +1 for several years. For 2009 it has been temporarily reduced to 0. 16 Incidentally, this target is a very good choice from the point of view of stabilizing the in equation (29) of 0.988, which is very close to the unit root on debt which has been found optimal in some theoretical literature. Equation (28) is a targeting rule, and it leaves open which instrument is to be used to move the government surplus in the desired direction. We will look at six possible instruments, three tax rates (τ c,t , τ L,t , τ k,t ) and three spending items
A second critical aspect of rule (28) concerns its performance at business cycle stabilization. The rule states that when the economy is hit with a shock that produces additional tax or copper revenue at given tax rates, all of that excess revenue should go towards repaying debt, while only the interest savings on debt that accrue over time should be used to gradually lower tax rates or increase spending. This is a natural rules-based way to formalize the popular notion of automatic stabilizers. Such a rule however mainly minimizes the volatility of fiscal instruments rather than of the business cycle.
A Tax Revenue Gap Targeting Rule
The critical insight for developing a more general class of rules is that the coefficients multiplying the gap variables in (28) can be varied continuously rather than being limited to values of 1 as in the SSR. We denote these coefficients by d tax and d cop . We also add an additional debt gap variable with coefficient d debt . The rule therefore becomeš
The case of d tax = d cop = d debt = 0 corresponds to a strict balanced budget rule (henceforth BBR). This is highly procyclical because it calls for lower tax rates (or higher spending) in a boom. It also implies volatile fiscal instruments. A choice of d tax > 1 is countercyclical by calling for a higher tax rate (or lower spending) in a boom. This does increase fiscal business cycle, because Chile's net assets to GDP ratio is currently around 10%. This coincidence of flow and implied stock targets makes it unnecessary to intertemporally vary fiscal instruments in order to allow debt to reach the stock target.
instrument volatility, but with tax rates moving in the opposite direction from a BBR. In the context of our model d tax > 1 represents systematic discretionary fiscal policy. But it can also be interpreted more broadly to represent automatic stabilizers in an economy where the tax system, unlike in our model, is progressive. But it is highly unlikely that such automatic stabilizers would be as countercyclical as the best rules selected by our welfare analysis.
We have considered variants of (33) 17 The resulting welfare gains are quantitatively smaller but qualitatively very similar to the baseline case. We therefore do not present them here. 18 We have mentioned that a key concern in fiscal policy concerns implementation lags. We have introduced such lags into the fiscal rule, but the results, not reported here, only reflect the extreme nature of LIQ consumption behavior. Specifically, their complete inability to smooth consumption even over short periods means that even a one period implementation lag is very costly. A more realistic answer to the question of implementation lags requires a more realistic model, such as a hybrid between the liquidity constrained agents and OLG models.
A Tax Revenue Gap Instrument Rule
Given the multiplicity of fiscal instruments there is a multiplicity of instrument rules that can be written as alternatives to the general targeting rule (33) . Our baseline will use targeted transfers as the instrument, in which case we have
whereῩ rat has been set to satisfy the structural surplus target gs/gdp = gs rat /100. 17 The evidence is however for less smoothing in fiscal policy than in monetary policy. See Gali and Perotti (2003) . 18 Such a variant of the rule would be essential in the case of permanent shocks that drive potential to a new level. In this paper all shocks are transitory.
Shocks
The seven shocks of the model are given by
where
Equilibrium and Balance of Payments
In equilibrium IN F and LIQ households maximize utility, manufacturers and distributors maximize the present discounted value of their cash flows, and the following market clearing conditions hold for the world copper market, and for each country's intermediate and final goods markets:
Furthermore, the net foreign asset evolution for Chile is given by
Notice that the last two terms represent the direct effects of the copper sector. Copper export earnings add to the trade surplus, but transfers of a share of copper revenue to other countries reduce the current account surplus. The current account equals the change in the level of net foreign assets, cǎ t = e tft − e t−1ft−1 / (π t g). The market clearing condition for international bonds is
Finally, GDP at consumer prices is
19 For the latter two only the market clearing conditions for Chile are listed. RW conditions are symmetric.
Computation of Welfare
Appendix B shows how we compute the Lucas (1987) compensating consumption variation (in percent) for each group of households, η IN F and η LIQ . With one exception we will only focus on aggregate welfare, which we define as the population-weighted average of compensating variations:
Calibration

Steady State
To fix steady state values we use sample averages of Chilean data for the period 1999Q3-2007Q4. Chile represents 0.3% of world GDP by setting ω = 1 and ω * = 332.333. Its per capita GDP is roughly equal to world per capita GDP.
Chile's steady state net foreign liabilities to GDP ratio is 20%, which implies a current account deficit to GDP ratio of 1%. We estimate ξ = 0.0006 from Chilean current account and risk premium data (withs = 3 in equation (3)), and use the (small) residuals from this regression to calibrate the shock process S f x t . We fix the steady state world real interest rate at 3% per annum,r = 1.0075, and the world real growth rate at 2% per annum, g = 1.005, which implies β = 0.9969 and β * = 0.9975. The steady state inflation rates for both countries are set at 3% per annum,π =π * = 1.0075.
As for household preferences, the labor supply elasticities are γ = γ * = 0.5, based on the evidence in Pencavel (1986) , and habit persistence is v = 0. When government consumption enters utility, we set χ to a value consistent with a unitary marginal rate of substitution between consumption of private and government goods, as in
Gali and Monacelli (2008).
The split of copper revenue into the incomes of domestic labor, domestic capital, domestic government and foreign investors is assumed to be 40%/20%/20%/20% in Chile and 40%/40%/20%/0% for RW. This reflects the low labor share of this sector, the high degree of state ownership in raw materials production worldwide, and the fact that the Chilean government, through the state owned copper company CODELCO, does receive roughly 50% of the profits of the copper sector, with the rest going to foreigners. The overall labor shares in both economies are 64%. The steady state investment to GDP ratios are 22%
in Chile (and 20% in RW). For government spending the overall ratios equal 12% and 18%, respectively, reflecting the relatively small size of Chile's public sector. We set the trade share parameters α H to produce a non-copper steady state imports to GDP ratio of 33%. For copper trade, we calibrate the supply and demand parametersx sup andᾱ X , first to reflect the ratio of the value of copper used in production to world GDP of 0.08%, and second to reflect the recent historic average Chilean copper exports to GDP ratio of 12.3%.
We assume a conventional Cobb-Douglas technology between capital and labor, a trade elasticity of ξ T = 1.5, and a low elasticity of substitution between copper and labor/capital ξ X = 0.5. The elasticity of substitution between final goods varieties is assumed to equal σ = 6, for a markup of 20%, which is common in the monetary business cycle literature.
One of the more challenging aspects of the model calibration is the public capital stock.
For the U.S. infrastructure investment represents one sixth of all government spending. This may however be too low as it assumes a zero productivity of public education and health spending. As a sensible middle ground we therefore raise that share to one third, or 4% of GDP in Chile. Kamps (2004) presents evidence for the depreciation rate of public capital of 4% per annum. We therefore set δ G = 0.01. The productivity of public capital is determined by the parameter α G . Ligthart and Suárez (2005) present a meta analysis that finds an elasticity of aggregate output with respect to public capital of 0.14, which we can replicate by setting α G = 0.1.
Given the calibration of spending, steady state transfers are set to replicate aggregate tax revenue to GDP ratios. Based on recent Chilean averages we set the steady state shares of consumption, labor, capital and lump-sum taxes in overall tax revenue at 50%, 15%, 14% and 25% 20 , with the corresponding numbers for RW of 35%, 35%, 8% and 22%. Government debt to GDP ratios are 0% in Chile (this ratio turned positive in 2006) and 50% in RW.
Policy Rules, Adjustment Costs and Shocks
The autocorrelation coefficients and standard deviations of the model's seven shocks, together with the real and nominal adjustment cost parameters φ I , φ T and φ P , are calibrated to reproduce the autocorrelations and standard deviations of detrended Chilean GDP, consumption, investment, inflation, physical copper output, and dollar copper prices for the period 1999Q3-2007Q4. 21 We calibrate monetary and fiscal policy according to the rules used in Chile during this time, either according to the authorities or available empirical
estimates. This was a period of high macroeconomic stability and without major changes in trend growth. We therefore detrended the data by removing a log-linear trend. Table 1 reports the moments of the data. The model is able to reproduce these exactly, because of two critical features. First, the endowment nature of the copper sector can generate the observed extreme volatility of copper prices. Second, the presence of liquidity constrained households ensures that the associated wealth effects do not generate excessively persistent output and consumption. In this calibration 60% of the variation in the Fisher chain-weighted measure of GDP is accounted for by productivity shocks, with 25% coming from shocks to the copper sector and 15% from demand shocks. Risk premium and inflation shocks have only a modest or no effect on the real economy, and in our presentation below we will therefore for the most part ignore them. We will show that our main results on welfare and fiscal instrument volatility are not sensitive to changes in the relative sizes of the shock processes, by decomposing the results into the contributions of the major shocks.
Results
Monetary Rules
In order to obtain a benchmark for the benefits of fiscal policy, we begin by computing the more familiar benefit of moving from completely fixed to optimally flexible exchange rates or inflation targeting. We first conduct a grid search over dynamically stable combinations of the parameters δ i and δ π of the monetary rule, holding all other parameters at their baseline values. 22 As is familiar from the literature, welfare increases in δ π , but with only small incremental benefits above δ π = 2. The maximum welfare gain however is very small at less than 0.03% of steady state consumption, for two reasons. First, we have chosen a fairly calm period for the Chilean economy. Second, monetary policy relies primarily on an intertemporal substitution channel, which in our economy is completely absent for 50% of the population. In our analysis of fiscal policy we will assume a specification of monetary policy that represents a compromise between the rule actually pursued in Chile according to its monetary authorities (δ i = 0.7 and δ π = 0.5) and the specification suggested by our grid search. We set δ i = 0.7 and δ π = 2, for a welfare gain of 0.025%.
Impulse Responses
Before analyzing the welfare implications of different rules, we illustrate their dynamic responses to shocks in Figures 1-3 It is easy to see that a countercyclical rule must improve welfare because of its powerful stabilizing effects on consumption and labor. Note however that the effects on GDP volatility are much smaller, while investment becomes more volatile.
In Figure 2 we turn to a one standard deviation shock to investment. This shock causes a strong increase in the real wage as firms attempt to hire more workers to benefit from more productive investment. This allows LIQ agents to reduce their labor supply while increasing their consumption. Because equilibrium employment does not rise dramatically, the effect on IN F agents is a strong increase in labor supply to make up for the reduction in LIQ labor supply. Copper revenue shocks are exogenous shocks to wealth that LIQ agents are unable to smooth. It is therefore optimal for the government to do so for them, by saving excess revenue and then slowly releasing it over time, in other words through a copper revenue SSR. Figure 4 illustrates the welfare effects of rule (33) as a function of its two key parameters, Welfare gains are hump-shaped in relation to d cop , with a maximum near 1 and very steep losses for large coefficients. The striking part of this figure is however the size of the gain, which at around 0.131% of balanced budget rule consumption is around four to five times larger than the gain of letting the exchange rate float. The remaining plots in Figure   4 show the contributions of the major shocks to this gain, leaving out inflation and risk premium shocks. We observe roughly equal contributions of technology, consumption demand, investment demand and copper demand shocks. For the domestic shocks the copper coefficient is nearly irrelevant. For the copper shocks it remains optimal to react countercyclically to the induced domestic tax revenue. In response to these shocks a coefficient choice for d cop in the neighborhood of 1 is optimal.
Welfare
d
Fiscal Instrument Volatility
To judge the attractiveness of fiscal rules to policymakers it is essential to evaluate not only welfare but also the implied fiscal instrument volatility. 23 Certainly in Chile's case a major reason behind the adoption of the SSR was a desire to minimize fiscal volatility rather than business cycle volatility, presumably because of costs of fiscal volatility not captured by the model. The frontier is vertical, minimizing fiscal volatility, near the SSR, and it is horizontal, maximizing welfare, at the optimized CCR. The relevant portion of the frontier is of course the one between the SSR and CCR, as all other portions combine decreasing welfare with increasing fiscal volatility. What is most striking about this portion is its steepness, meaning a large increase in welfare is possible at a small cost in terms of fiscal volatility. Between the SSR and the CCR welfare increases by about 50% while fiscal volatility only increases by about 25%, or 0.25% of GDP.
Welfare -Fiscal Instrument Volatility Efficiency Frontiers
Macroeconomic Volatility
Policymakers will also be interested in how welfare gains relate to volatilities of various macroeconomic aggregates. Figure 7 shows how the standard deviations of several key variables change as the targeting version of the rule is made more countercyclical by raising d tax from 0 to 5. 25 In these plots we again hold d cop at 1 and the debt coefficient at the smallest possible value consistent with non-exploding debt. For comparison, the first subplot shows the breakdown of overall weighted welfare into the welfare of IN F and LIQ agents. The key observation is that nearly all the welfare improvement achieved by fiscal rules is due to their effect on LIQ agents.
25 These are standard deviations of 100 times the log of the respective variable.
The volatilities of consumption and employment are the determinants of welfare. A more countercyclical rule achieves a dramatic reduction in employment volatility, both for LIQ agents (from 2.2 to less than 1) and INF agents (from 1.5 to 0.7). This comes both through the direct effect of supplementing the income of LIQ agents who are thereby in less need of varying their labor supply to sustain their consumption levels, and through the reduced labor market spillovers to INF agents that this makes possible. The volatility of LIQ consumption is also considerably reduced (from 2 to 1.75). But note that the optimal rule does not minimize the variance of GDP, which in fact increases somewhat from 1.52 to 1.6, principally due to more variable INF consumption and investment.
Other Real Activity Gaps?
A natural question is whether an output gap (actual or flexible price) or an absorption gap might not perform better than the tax revenue gap. We have examined both alternatives, and the answer is that they perform much worse. The reason is that, as we have seen above, in an economy with liquidity constrained agents the most important task of policy is to stabilize income (of liquidity constrained agents) rather than output or absorption. Labor and capital income are a very important part of the tax base, so that a countercyclical response to tax revenue will automatically stabilize income. This effect will be even stronger in economies that rely more heavily than Chile on income taxation. It might be possible to construct an even better theoretical measure of an income gap, but in practice the tax revenue gap is likely to represent the preferred combination of theoretical desirability and practical implementability. 
Openness
Alternative Fiscal Instruments
The results presented so far have all been based on using targeted transfers as the instrument of fiscal policy, by letting them adjust endogenously to satisfy rules (33) 26 Using government investment spending alone as an instrument requires extreme variability in this variable. We were not able to obtain computational solutions for this case.
This however is based on the assumption that government consumption does not enter private utility. If it does, with a marginal rate of substitution of one, the previous results are reversed, with government spending performing much better than transfers. This is shown in Figure 9b . The intuition is that countercyclical government consumption now helps to smooth the flow of overall utility.
As the existing literature focuses almost exclusively on debt gap rules, Figure This is because a debt gap rule is not designed to stabilize income. 
Conclusion
This paper has presented an analysis of systematic rules-based fiscal policy in an open economy DSGE model with non-Ricardian household behavior. The motivation behind this research is to start developing a framework that could eventually become the equivalent in practical usefulness to interest rate rules in monetary policy.
In terms of delivering on this agenda, the results presented in this paper are encouraging.
We have developed a class of rules, tax revenue gap rules, that delivers sizeable welfare gains relative to a balanced budget rule, and also in comparison to monetary policy rules. These gains are achieved at a very modest cost in terms of fiscal instrument volatility, and the reductions in macroeconomic volatility corresponding to the welfare gains are substantial.
We have shown how to represent such rules as either targeting rules or instrument rules, and we have presented a performance comparison of different fiscal instruments which suggests that targeted transfers, consumption and labor taxes are roughly equally effective, but inferior to government spending if the latter enters utility with a unitary marginal rate of substitution with consumption. Finally, we have shown that shocks to raw materials revenue should be treated differently from shocks to regular tax revenue. The government should respond to such shocks by performing consumption smoothing on behalf of liquidity constrained households. In other words, it should rely on automatic stabilizers.
Our work suggests a number of issues that should be investigated in more detail. First, the dependence of the performance of tax revenue gap rules on the composition of a country's tax base should be investigated in detail. Second, the joint optimization of monetary and fiscal policies deserves further study. Space constraints prevent us from undertaking either of these tasks here. We aim to do so in future research.
Appendix A. Optimality Conditions of the Model
The optimality conditions of INF households for domestic and foreign bonds, aggregate consumption and aggregate labor supply are, after rescaling by technology, given by 
